Abstract
Introduction
Cloud computing has drawn much attention from research and industry in recent years. Remote user authentication is a critical component of accessing remote services in cloud computing applications. Two-factor authenticated key agreement scheme based on password and smart card is the most convenient and popular way to protect the communication between the user and the remote server. To provide user anonymity, dynamic ID-based authentication schemes are proposed. Over the years, numerous of such schemes have been presented. Unfortunately, many of them have been pointed out to be flawed.
In 1981, Lamport [1] first considered password authentication scheme in the public network. This scheme is insecure if the verification table stored in the server is modified by an intruder. In 1990, Chang and Wu designed a remote authentication scheme without verification tables. This scheme reduces the server's burden of maintaining and protecting the verification tables. In 1991, Chang and Wu [2] proposed the first password authentication scheme using smart cards. Since then, many smart card based password authentication scheme were proposed to enhance security. These schemes assume the smart cards are tamper resistance. In 1999-2002, Kocher et al. [3] and Messerges et al. [4] pointed out that the secret data stored in the smart card could be extracted by physical intrusion or monitoring the power consumption. Therefore, these schemes become insure when we consider the smart card loss problem [5] , especially off-line password guessing attacks and user impersonation attack.
In 2006, Liao et al. [6] considered ten desirable properties to evaluate the smart card based password authentication scheme. Later, Madhusudhan et al. [7] and Wang et al. [8] expanded the set of desirable security properties.
To lay particular stress on practice, we put forward the more comprehensive desirable security requirements based earlier studies.
• No verification table: The server should not store any sensitive information corresponding to a particular user. Therefore, the server need not maintain and protect the verification table. If the server stores the user's authentication information, the server will be the attack target. There are many concrete cases that the hacker breaks the server and steals the verification table.
• No timestamps: Using timestamps will cause a lot of problems such as synchronization and delay problem. • Public identity: It is prefer for the user to select his email address as the identity. It is not reasonable for the user to keep his identity secret. If the scheme to authenticate a user requests the user provide his identity, password and the smart card, this scheme will not be two-factor scheme and turn to a three-factor scheme.
• Resilience of privileged administrator attack: The password should only known by the user. Anyone, including the privileged administrator should not obtain the information about password. This assumption is reasonable. In some previous scheme, the user registers the system by sending his ID and password directly. Since many people use the same password in different applications, once the privileged administrator obtains a user's password, then, he can enter the user's other application using the compromised password.
• Freely chosen password: The user can selects his password and updates his password complying with his will.
• Mutual authentication: The attacker cannot impersonate the user even if he steals the user's smart card or password, but not both. The attacker cannot impersonate the server.
• Resilience of off-line password guessing attack: The scheme should resist off-line password guessing attack even if the attacker steals the user's smart card and extract the sensitive information stored in card.
• Resilience of undetected on-line password guessing attack: The scheme should resist undetected on-line password guessing attack even if the attacker steals the user's smart card and extract the sensitive information stored in card. An incorrect password guessing will be recorded by the server.
• No key control: The user and the server can agree on a session key. This session key should not be preselect by one of the participants. • Key secrecy: The session key agreed by the user and the server should not be learned by the others. • User anonymity: The user's identity should not revealed by the attacker.
• Unlinkability: The different sessions for the same user should not be linked by the attacker.
• Known-key security: If the attacker compromises a pervious session key, he could not impersonate the user or the server, compute the session key or derive the user's identity in another session. If the attacker compromises a pervious session key, he could not link the pervious session to the other one.
• Perfect forward security: Even if all secrets kept by the user and the server are compromised now, the scheme should provide key secrecy, user anonymity and session unlinkability for pervious sessions.
• Auditability: The scheme should support auditability by the server. If the scheme lacks the auditability, the user may abuse his privilege and free from responsibility. Further more, the cardholder can clone his smart card and sell to other people • Availability: The scheme should prevent from denial-of-service attack (DoS attack).
If the attacker obtains the smart card temporarily, the attacker should not change the password without the user's authorization.
Comparing the set of security requirement given by Madhusudhan et al. [7] and Wang et al. [8] , we point out that it is necessary for a dynamic ID scheme to provide public user identity, unlinkability, forward anonymity and forward unlinkability, etc.
In 2012-2013, Madhusudhan et al. [7] and Xie [9] claimed that none of the existing schemes can achieve all the desirable security properties. Recently, to remove the security weaknesses of Lee [8, 14] proposed some novel dynamic ID based authentication schemes. However, in this paper we find these schemes cannot satisfy the desirable security requirements. Our result shows that it is still difficult to design dynamic ID based authentication schemes which meet all the desirable security goals using password and smart card.
Li et al.'s Dynamic ID based Remote User Authentication Scheme for Multi-server Environment
The Li et al.'s scheme contains four phases. We show the main phases in Figure 1 . In Li et al.'s scheme, the registration center RC chooses the secret key x and y. RC computes h(x||y) and h(SID||h(y)) where SID is the identity of the server S, and then sends them to S via a secure channel. 
Registration Phase
Assume that the user U and the registration center RC have established a secure channel. U and RC perform the following steps in registration phase.
Step 1: U chooses identity ID, password PW and a random value b. U computes A=h(b ⊕PW) and sends {ID,A} to RC.
Step 2: RC computes B=h(ID||x), C=h(ID||h(y)||A), D=h(B||(x||y)) and E=B⊕h(x||y). RC stores {C,D,E,h(),h(y)} on a smart card and sends it to U.
Step 3: U stores b into the smart card.
Login Phase
Whenever U intends to access the resources of S, U and S perform the following steps.
Step 1: U inserts the smart card and keys ID and PW. Then the smart card computes A=h(b⊕PW) and checks whether C is equal to h(ID||h(y)||A). If they are not equal,the smart card terminates the session.
Step 
Verification Phase
Step 1: Upon receiving the login message {P,CID, Step 2: Upon receiving {M 3 ,M 4 }, U computes N j =A ⊕ N i ⊕ M 4 and checks h(D||A||N j ||SID) with M 3 . If they are not equal, U terminates the session. Then, the U computes SK=h(D||A||N i ||N j ||SID) as the session key and sends M 5 =h(D||A||N i ||SID) to S.
Step 3: Upon receiving M 5 , S computes h(D||A||N i ||SID) and checks it with M 5 . If they are equal, S successfully authenticates U and computes SK=h(D||A||N i ||N j ||SID) as the session key.
Password Change Phase
Step 1: U inserts the smart card and keys ID and PW. The smart card computes A=h(b ⊕PW) and checks whether h(ID||h(y)||A) is equal to C. If they are not equal, the smart card terminates the session. Otherwise, U chooses a new password PW new and a new random number b new .
Step 2: The smart card computes A new =h(b new ⊕PW new ) and C new =h(ID||h(y)||A new ) and replaces {b,C} with {b new , C new }.
Cryptanalysis of Li et al.'s Scheme
Smart Card Loss Problem. Li et al.'s dynamic ID scheme cannot achieve two-factor authentication. The authors claimed that even the attacker extracts the information stored in the smart card he cannot login into the system. We assume that the attacker obtains a user's smart card. Without the user's password, the attacker can impersonate the cardholder to cheat the server.
Step 1: The attacker first extracts the information {C,D,E,h(),h(y),b} stored in the smart card and intends to cheat the server S.
Step 2: The attacker generates a nonce N i and a random value CID. Then he computes (y) Step 1: The attacker first extracts h(y) stored in his smart card. We notice that h(y) is the same as the value stored in other smart card.
P=E⊕h(h(SID||h
Step Step 3: The attacker comes near the server S and intercepts the transmitted message {P,CID, (y) )||N * ). Obviously, there is E * =E where E=h(ID||x)⊕h(x||y). x and y are constants in the system. For different identity ID, the corresponding value of E is different. After the attacker derive the unique value of E, the attacker can trace the user by observing this value. Thus. the inside attacker can link the different sessions to the same user.
Compromise of Identity Problem. In Li et al.'s dynamic ID scheme, the authors suppose that the identity and the password should be kept secret simultaneously. It is not reasonable in practice. In many applications, a user registers the system using Email address, phone number or student number as his identity. These identity information are known to all. Even the identity is a secret key of the user, the scheme could not satisfy key independence. If the attacker compromises a user's identity ID, he can launch off-line password guessing attack on a stolen smart card.
Step 1: The attacker first extracts the information {C,h(y),b} stored in the smart card. We have an identical equation C=h(ID||h(y)||h(b⊕PW)).
Step 2: The attacker guesses a password PW * and checks whether C is equal to h(ID||h(y)||h(b⊕PW * )). If they are equal, the attacker obtains the correct password, otherwise, the attacker tries another password.
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The weakness of Li's scheme is due to the fact that the user's identity is related to the password by the value of C=h(ID||h(y)||h(b⊕PW)) stored in the smart card.
Wang et al.'s Dynamic ID based Remote User Authentication Scheme
The Wang et al.'s scheme also contains four phases: registration phase, login phase, verification phase and password change phase. We show these first three phases in Figure  2 .
Figure 2. Wang et al.'s Scheme

Registration Phase
We assume that the user U and the server S have established a secure channel. Let y=g x mod n where n is a larger prime. (x,y) denote S's private key and its corresponding public key. U and S perform the following steps in registration phase.
Step 1: U chooses identity ID, password PW and a random value b. U sends {ID,h(b||PW)} to S. Step 2: S computes N=h(b||PW) ⊕ h(x||ID) and A=h(ID||h(b||PW)). S stores {N,A,n,g,y,h()} on a smart card and sends it to U.
Login Phase
Step 1: U inserts the smart card and keys ID and PW. Then the smart card computes A * =h(ID||h(b||PW)) and checks whether A * is equal to the stored A. If they are not equal,the smart card terminates the session.
Step 2: The smart card generates a nonce u and computes C 1 =g u mod n, Y 1 =y u mod n, k=N⊕h(b||PW), CID=ID⊕h(C 1 ||Y 1 ) and M=h(CID||C 1 ||k). U sends login request message {C 1 ,CID,M} to S.
Verification Phase
Step 1: Upon receiving the login message {C 1 ,CID,M}, S computes Y 2 =(C 1 )
x mod n, ID=CID⊕h(C 1 ||Y 2 ) and M * =h(CID||C 1 ||h(x||ID)) where x is its private key. S compares M * with the received M. If they are not equal, the session is terminated. Otherwise, S generates a random number v and computes SK=(C 1 ) v mod n, C 2 =g v mod n and C 3 =h(SK||C 2 ||h(x||ID)). Finally, S sends {C 2 , C 3 } to U.
Step 2: Upon receiving {C 2 , C 3 }, U computes SK=(C 2 ) u mod n, C 3 * =h(SK||C 2 ||k), and checks C 3 * with C 3 . If they are equal, U sets SK as the session key and sends C 4 =h(C 3 ||k||SK) to S.
Step 3: Upon receiving C 4 , S computes C 4 * =h(C 3 ||h(x||ID)||SK) and then checks whether C 4 * is equal to C 4 . If the verification holds, S authenticates U and sets SK as the session key, otherwise, the session is terminated.
Password Change Phase
Step 1: U inserts the smart card and keys ID and PW. The smart card computes A * =h(ID||h(b||PW)) and checks whether A * is equal to A. If they are not equal, the smart card terminates the session. Otherwise, U picks a new password PW new .
Step 2: The smart card computes N new =N⊕h(b||PW)⊕h(b||PW new ), A new =h(ID||h(b||PW new )) and replaces N,A with N new and A new .
Cryptanalysis of Wang et al.'s Scheme
Off-line Password Guessing Attack. Wang et al. claimed that if the attacker steals a smart card and reveal the card's secret information he cannot launch off-line password guessing attack because he cannot guess ID and PW correctly at the same time. However, the attacker can launch password guessing attack without guessing the identity.
Step 1: The attacker first extracts the information {N,A,n,g,y,h(),b} stored in the smart card.
Step 2: The attacker recorded login request message {C 1 ,CID,M} in a previous session.
